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Abstract
The overwhelming majority of retrospective merger studies pool the post-merger 
data to estimate the average price effect of the merger. Pooled post-merger esti-
mates ignore key information about price dynamics and are unable to identify if 
post-merger prices revert to pre-merger levels within the same time period. We pro-
vide evidence—from a meta-analysis of over 600 previous market-level price effect 
estimates, and a set of Monte Carlo experiments—that using pooled models often 
leads to erroneous conclusions: for example by wrongly concluding that the merger 
increased prices, even when this price increase was only temporary.
Keywords Mergers · Merger retrospectives · Meta study · Monte Carlo simulations
JEL Classification codes C51 · K21 · L49
1 Introduction
The price effect of past mergers has received increasing attention since the early 
1990s. The recent upsurge in the number of such studies generated a considerable 
body of evidence of the price effect of mergers. Kwoka (2013, 2014) identified more 
than 60 US studies that looked at the price effect of mergers. Mariuzzo et al. (2016) 
reviewed another 20 similar European studies.
Methodologically, these studies are relatively homogeneous. They use stand-
ard difference in-differences type models, and they vary mainly in the way the 
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counterfactual is constructed. The objective of our paper is to focus on a specific 
empirical aspect of these studies, the handling of post-merger time-periods. The 
specification of the estimated model plays a cardinal role in how the results should 
be interpreted. Most previous studies estimate over-time average post-intervention 
price-effects; these studies overlook post-merger price dynamics. In general, in 
many causal inference studies the post-intervention dynamics of the outcome vari-
able would not matter. However, there are equally many situations where evidence 
on this variation is exactly what the researcher should be aiming to get. Estimating 
the price effect of mergers is one of these.1
Estimating the over-time average price effect of mergers is counter-intuitive for 
two main reasons. First, merger guidelines agree that no intervention is needed if the 
post-merger price increase disappears within a reasonable amount of time, for exam-
ple because of new entry. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines say: “The Agency 
will consider entry to be timely so long as it would deter or counteract the competi-
tive effects of concern within the two year period and subsequently.”2 Similarly, the 
European Commission’s guidelines on the Merger Regulation state: “The Commis-
sion examines whether entry would be sufficiently swift and sustained to deter or 
defeat the exercise of market power. What constitutes an appropriate time period 
depends on the characteristics and dynamics of the market, as well as on the specific 
capabilities of potential entrants. However, entry is normally only considered timely 
if it occurs within two years.”3 Of course for entry to occur, a potential entrant would 
have to find such entry profitable, and the extent of entry would have to be such that 
prices would revert to (or remain at) pre-merger levels. Retrospective studies could 
verify whether these conditions are fulfilled after a merger. However, entry and its 
effects are a gradual process (prices might take some time to drop or to increase), 
which requires looking at the dynamics of post-merger prices in order to identify 
whether pre-merger expectations about entry—and the effect of entry—were correct.
Second, merger retrospectives are typically conducted to inform policy-makers 
whether a merger decision was correct or not. For this reason the conclusion as to 
how prices change post-merger is crucial. The estimation of the average post-merger 
price-effect requires a different empirical model than estimating annual effects. Is it 
possible that the two empirical models return different evidence on the price effects 
of the merger? We show in this paper that the likelihood of making the wrong con-
clusion is very high if the wrong empirical model is used.
The purpose of this paper is not to stipulate that longer-term studies are better 
suited for post-merger price evaluations, although given merger policy guidelines, 
1 The importance of controlling for dynamics in difference-in-differences studies, is not new to the eco-
nomics literature. A good example of the bias that can be generated by using a misspecified model is 
given by Wolfers’s’s (2006) study of the causal effect of the implementation of unilateral divorce laws in 
the US on divorce rates.
2 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), avail-
able at https ://www.justi ce.gov/atr/horiz ontal -merge r-guide lines -08192 010, accessed 25/09/2017.
3 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), available at http://eur-lex.europ a.eu/LexUr iServ /
LexUr iServ .do?uri=OJ:C:2004:031:0005:0018:en:PDF, accessed 25/09/2107.
1 3
Post-merger Price Dynamics Matters, So Why Do Merger…
it appears appropriate to include at least two post-merger years in any merger evalu-
ation. Instead we argue that even if the available data are relatively short-spanning 
(two years), one should still look at the dynamics of price effects (for example the 
effect in the first and in the second year separately) and not only the over-time aver-
age as it is currently done in the majority of studies. The difference is easy to see. 
Take a merger, that increases prices by 10 percent in the year following the merger 
but then prices revert to the pre-merger level in the second post-merger year. Cur-
rently, only one in five merger retrospectives estimate these annual price effects and 
would conclude that post-merger prices reverted to pre-merger levels by the end of 
the second year. Four in five studies would estimate an over time average. In this 
case this would imply a 5 percent price increase and could lead to the conclusion 
that the merger was anticompetitive, and that the intervention was insufficient.4
There is surprisingly little empirical work on the dynamics of how markets 
evolve post-merger, and whether the antitrust agency’s expectations at the time of 
the merger came true (for example, did entry happen as expected and did it reduce 
prices as predicted?) A notable exception is a set of annually conducted studies by 
the UK Competition Commission, which used to collect qualitative evidence on 
how market characteristics (other than just price) evolved over a longer post-merger 
period.5 With regard to specific mergers, Winston et  al. (2011) look at the long-
run effect of two railroad mergers. They estimate how prices evolved (year-by-year) 
post-merger and find that despite the short-term increases in price the mergers had 
no effect in the long-run on prices and welfare. Looking at mergers in the US market 
for bank deposits Focarelli and Panetta (2003) arrive at similar conclusions: mergers 
create higher prices in the more immediate aftermath of the merger, but this effect 
later disappears.6
We contribute to the rich body of merger retrospective studies in an important 
way, by pointing out how inappropriately designed empirical models, irrespective 
of data availability, will mask important information on the price effect of merg-
ers. First we formalise the problem and argue that pooling together all post-merger 
time periods will provide price-effect estimates that are the average of the per period 
(annual) effects with a standard error that is lower than the standard errors of the 
annual price effects (at least under the assumption of non-positive correlation). This 
difference in standard errors has an important role to play in our main argument.
We attempt to demonstrate the effect of choosing the wrong model by employ-
ing a meta-analysis of more than 600 previous market-level price-effect estimates. 
Where estimates were available on price dynamics—e.g. where a study estimated 
4 Of course, it is an equally important question: what happens if the merger is followed by a temporary 
price increase, which is dissipated within two years following the merger, for example because of new 
entry. Implicitly, current merger guidelines overlook this temporary consumer welfare loss if entry is 
sufficiently timely so that consumers are not significantly harmed by the temporary loss of competition.
5 These can be found in the old UK Competition Commission’s archives, see for example here: https ://
goo.gl/soj2x k.
6 Of course when the time period post merger is too long there is more of a risk of picking confound-
ing effects. However, this is an issue shared both by pooled and unpooled models. In light of this in our 
analysis we concentrate on a medium-run period of time.
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annual effects—we were able to show how far off the over-time average estimates 
would have been. On the other hand, where only over-time average estimates were 
reported in the studies (this is what we refer to as inappropriate model choice), we 
could not re-construct the per-period variation in prices, therefore we turned to a set 
of Monte Carlo simulations and calibrations. These simulations show that models 
that estimate an average post-merger price effect are more likely to lead to erroneous 
conclusions (e.g. concluding that the merger increased prices, even when it did not, 
or concluding that the merger did not increase prices even when it did).
The paper is structured the following way. First, we describe how previous papers 
have handled post-merger price dynamics and show that this has been typically 
ignored. We then provide a discussion of the difference between the pooled and 
unpooled time period models. This is followed by a set of simulations and calibra-
tions to demonstrate the magnitude of the problem, and we conclude with policy 
recommendations.
2  Post‑merger Price‑Dynamics in Previous Merger Retrospectives
We surveyed a large body of retrospective merger studies reviewed by Kwoka (2013) 
and Mariuzzo et al. (2016).7 We focus on one aspect of these studies: the economet-
ric specification for estimating post-merger price effects. The main selection condi-
tions for our sample are: that ex-post percentage price-effect estimates are provided 
in the study, that their standard errors can be recovered, and that the time span of the 
data is identifiable. All of the studies in our sample used reduced-form causal infer-
ence models (typically difference-in-differences).
Our sample contains price-effect estimates of 68 mergers (which are discussed 
in 39 papers that are either published or in circulation as working paper at the time 
of our analysis). Of the 68 mergers, 52 are US mergers, and 16 EU.8 Some of the 
retrospective merger papers report estimates for the effect of the given merger on a 
range of different product and geographical markets. This gives us a sample of 626 
market-level price-effect estimates.9
We distinguish between two types of studies. The first, and by far the most com-
mon, treats the post-merger period as a single period, and pools all post-merger 
price observations, and thus estimates the average effect of the merger over the 
post-merger period. We call this set of studies “pooled studies”. The second group 
controls for price observations year by year, and estimates annual post-merger price 
changes (“unpooled studies”).
More than 80% of the 68 merger studies have pooled the post-merger time peri-
ods and estimated an average price effect for the entire post-merger period. Similarly 
most of the product/geographic market-level price effects—558 out of 626—are 
7 The full list of these studies is provided in the “Appendix”. The data is available at: https ://githu b.com/
Peter Ormos i/merge r-dynam ic.
8 Kwoka (2013, 2014) and Mariuzzo et al. (2016) provide more information about these mergers.
9 We provide descriptive information on these estimates in the “Appendix”.
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estimated by pooling the post-merger period data. The remaining 68 market-level 
estimates—10 merger studies that were published in 5 papers—are from unpooled 
studies. More detailed description of the data is given in the “Appendix”.
Another striking figure in the data is that more than 80% of these merger stud-
ies have estimated the average price effect within less than two years of the merger. 
There are two problems with this. First, estimating an over-time average completely 
masks the dynamics of post-merger prices, and as such is inadequate for evaluating 
the effectiveness of merger control. Second, it does not allow for a full assessment 
of how prices evolve over time. Both the EU and the US guidelines emphasise that 
a merger may not be considered problematic if appropriate entry happens within 
two years of the merger, therefore the knowledge of how prices changed within two 
years cannot fully answer the question of whether a merger decision was effective.
Table 1 shows the number of mergers that have been evaluated in retrospective 
studies published in the most frequent outlets (two or more mergers covered). The 
American Economic Review (including Papers and Proceedings) published the larg-
est number of merger studies, most use the pooled model. The Journal of Law and 
Economics has the highest propensity of studies that use the unpooled model.
An interesting question—although somewhat tangential to our main story—is 
whether the choice of the model (pooled or unpooled) is random with respect to 
the type of mergers. As a simple test, we compare the distribution of price effect 
estimates for the two groups. A comparison at the market/product level of estimates 
(626 estimates), using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) equality-of-distri-
butions test, provides evidence that the two distributions differ. However, when we 
collapse the samples to merger-level estimates (68 estimates) and repeat the two-
sample KS test we find that the null hypothesis of equality-of distributions is not 
rejected. The focus of this paper is on the dynamics of price changes and not on 
their general distribution, however the evidence that the pooled and unpooled distri-
butions do not differ at the merger level could be interpreted as a sign that the merg-
ers in the two groups are roughly comparable. Again, this is not required for our 
main point about using the right estimation model, but it helps illustrate our point.
Table 1  Number and fraction of pooled and unpooled studies by journals
Journal # # of pooled # of unpooled % of pooled % of unpooled
AM ECON REV 8 6 2 0.75 0.25
GAO 7 7 0 1.00 0.00
J INDUS ECON 6 5 1 0.83 0.17
J L AND ECON 6 4 2 0.67 0.33
INT’L J ECON BUS 6 6 0 1.00 0.00
WP 6 6 0 1.00 0.00
FTC 3 2 1 0.67 0.33
AM ECON J-ECON POL 3 3 0 1.00 0.00
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 2 0 1.00 0.00
J TRANSP ECON POLICY 2 2 0 1.00 0.00
MANAG DECIS ECON 2 2 0 1.00 0.00
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2.1  Pooled and Unpooled Post‑merger Price Effect Estimates
To summarise previous price-effect estimates we adopt a meta-analysis approach. 
For each retrospective merger study we take note of the estimated difference-in-
differences (DiD) coefficients of percentage price changes and their corresponding 
standard errors. The rule that we follow in recording the relevant estimates is the 
following. If the retrospective study presented more than one regression for each 
market (often included in the study as part of robustness checks), our strategy was to 
include the average DiD estimates (and average standard error estimates) over these 
regressions. When the standard error was not reported in the merger study we prox-
ied it from any useful information that was available. We often used the stars on the 
significance of the coefficients to retrieve the standard errors.10
Table 2 shows the result of our meta-analysis, when the estimates are collapsed 
by mergers (and not by product/market).11 The pooled column shows the price 
effects that were estimated with the use of models that pool data for up to two years 
after the merger. The unpooled column also shows the estimated effects within 
two years from the merger but only for studies where the first, and the second year 
effects were separately estimated. Both of these price effect estimates are relative 
Table 2  Meta analysis results—price effects within two years of the mergers (relative to the year prior to 
the merger)
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Period Pooled Period Unpooled
Mean SE Count Mean SE Count
Unweighted
≤ 2 years 3.240*** 0.648 52 First year 5.388** 2.630 10
Second year − 1.040 2.000 10
Weighted by t-stat
≤ 2 years 5.044*** 0.269 52 First year 5.280*** 2.040 10
Second year − 0.782 1.554 10
Weighted by journal impact factor
≤ 2 years 4.607*** 1.355 52 First year 5.989*** 2.170 10
Second year − 0.826 1.430 10
Weighted by journal citations
≤ 2 years 5.149** 2.047 52 First year 3.301 2.069 10
Second year − 1.708 1.640 10
10 For example, if the DiD coefficient was significant at 1% (typically indicated with three stars), we 
generated the proxied standard error as ratio between the estimate and critical value 2.575. When it was 
significant at 5% we used as denominator the mid-point between 1.96 and 2.575, and when the signifi-
cance was at 10% the division was by the mid-point between 1.645 and 1.96. Finally, in case of non-
significance the value chosen as the denominator was the mid-point between 0.8225 (itself a mid-point 
between 0 and 1.645) and 1.645.
11 The market level summary of the meta study is given in the “Appendix”.
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to the pre-merger price. The first section displays the unweighted combined price 
effects of mergers. The second section describes the combined estimates where we 
use the t-value of the estimated percentage price effect as weights. The idea is that 
observations with larger t-values should weigh more in combining the results from 
different merger studies.12 The third section contains the meta price effect where we 
weight each estimate by the number of citations the publication received up to that 
day (as shown on Google Scholar on 20 September 2017). Finally, in the fourth sec-
tion, we conduct a similar exercise and obtained from ReserchGate the impact factor 
of the publications for the most recent year, 2015/16. For manuscripts and working 
papers, for which no such information was available, we associate a minimal weight 
value of 0.3.
The results from our meta-analysis reveal an interesting pattern. When the 
unpooled model was used—post-merger annual estimates are provided—the post-
merger price increase, on average, disappeared by the second year following the 
merger (prices reverted to pre-merger levels). When the pooled model was used, the 
unweighted estimate is close to the average of the two years following the merger. 
This is in line with what we will show formally later: that the pooled model deliv-
ers the arithmetic mean of the estimates from the unpooled model. If we accept that 
the selection of the model—pooled or unpooled—is independent of the merger, this 
would suggest that had the 10 studies that used the unpooled model relied on the 
pooled model, the estimates would have been similar to the estimates found in the 
pooled model.
More importantly, this suggests that on average, the use of the pooled model, as 
has been done dominantly in previous literature, is more likely to conclude wrongly 
that the merger increased prices, even if the price increase disappeared by the end 
of the second post-merger year. This matters because the policy interpretation of the 
two findings are contrastingly different. A merger with a price increase that disap-
pears within two years would not be subject to intervention, but a merger that leads 
to a price increase over the first two years would.13
The point we are trying to emphasise here is not about using longer spanning 
data—although two post-merger years is a minimum to be in line with merger 
guidelines. But to make sure that the dynamics of price changes are identifiable 
from the estimated model. One of the main reasons for conducting merger retrospec-
tives is to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of merger control (Kwoka 
2013). On this ground, one would expect the merger retrospective to provide an idea 
of whether the antitrust authority made the right decision. For example, if prices 
increased after the merger it might be interpreted as an error by the antitrust author-
ity. On the other hand, if the estimates show that post-merger prices converge to zero 
within a reasonable length of time, then the antitrust authority did not make an error 
even if the initial price effect was significantly positive. Estimating the post-merger 
12 This is very similar to inverse variance weights.
13 Of course, the magnitude of the average price effects presented in Table 2 is small enough to suggest 
that they would have probably passed under some sort of ’safe harbour’ rule. Nevertheless, our point is 
not to argue for or against the merger decisions, rather to draw light to a methodological flaw in the ex-
post studies.
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over-time average does not allow us to analyse price dynamics. Instead, it could 
wrongly conclude that merger control was too lax—even in cases where post-merger 
prices revert to pre-merger levels by the end of the second post-merger year. In the 
following section we formulate the difference between estimating average or annual 
post-merger price effects.
3  A Conceptual Framework
For each market m and time t, let pmt denote the price of a unit (product or firm) 
and Wm the treatment dummy variable (firm/product involved in the merger). TL 
periods are recorded before—and TR after—a merger that takes place in period 0. 
Let dk represent a dummy variable that takes the value 1 every kth period after the 
merger, and zero otherwise. The sum of the post-treatment dummy variables is used 
in the pooled model, and is denoted as DTR ≡
∑TR
k=1
dk . Furthermore, indicate with 
휏 = 1,… , T  fragments of time within a period k; for example 휏 could measure days 
and k years–when we have daily price data but are estimating yearly price effects 
post treatment. Examining the yearly effects for TR periods following the merger and 
one period pre-merger ( TL = 1 ), we can express the unpooled linear econometric 
equation for prices as: 
where 훿k are the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators for each year after the 
merger; 훼m is a market-specific unobservable variable; and 휆휏 is a set of controls that 
capture possible seasonality in the data. If we assume that the dataset is balanced, 
the total time observations are T × (TR + 1).
As was discussed earlier, what is typically estimated in most merger retrospective 
studies is a slightly different model, with time-period post-merger dummy variables 
replaced by a pooled period post-merger dummy:
where the DiD estimator for a pooled period of length TR is denoted with ΔTR . Equa-
tion (1b) is what we refer to as the pooled model. Equation (1b) can be seen as a 
restricted version of Eq. (1a) once we impose 훾1 = 훾2 =⋯ = 훾TR = 훤TR , along with 
the further restriction 훿1 = 훿2 =⋯ = 훿TR = ΔTR ; but as we will show later, even in 
this case standard errors may differ.
If we consider an analysis that is restricted to only two years after the merger 
( TR = 2 ) and one year before the merger ( TL = 1 ), and use the unpooled model, we 
have that the DiD coefficient for the second year from the above equation, when 
separate time period dummy variables are included, can be written as: 
(1a)
pmt = 훽0 + 훽1Wm +
TR∑
k=1
(
훾kdk + 훿kdkWm
)
+ 훼m + 휆휏 + 휀mt,
m = {1, 2,… ,M}; t = {−T ,… ,−1, 1,… , T × TR},
(1b)pmt = 훽0 + 훽1Wm + 훤TRDTR + ΔTRDTRWm + 훼m + 휆휏 + 휀mt,
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For two periods after the merger the pooled model DiD estimator is:
What are the implications, for the ex-post merger analysis, of using a period-by-
period dummy variable (unpooled) version rather a pooled period dummy variable 
model?
Continuing with the simplifying example where we focus only on the two peri-
ods that follow the merger, let us assume that there is a price increase in the first 
period—𝛿1 > 0—but then prices revert to pre-merger levels in the second period: 
훿2 = 0 . This is an example of a merger that would be considered unharmful because 
the price effect would have vanished after one year, perhaps because of entry.
Suppose that we have estimated the parameters Δ̂2 , 훿̂1 , and 훿̂2 with the use of the 
two different specifications. In “Appendix B” we show that the restricted estimator 
Δ̂2 is equal to the average of the yearly time period parameters, (훿̂1 + 훿̂2)∕2 . Then, 
on the assumption that the central limit theorem holds, the time period estimators 
for a sample of size N = T × (K + 1) ×M have the following probability distribu-
tions: 훿̂1 ∼ N
(
훿1, 휎
2
훿1
∕N
)
 , 훿̂2 ∼ N
(
훿2, 휎훿2
2
∕N
)
 , which leads to Δ̂
2
∼ N
(
(훿
1
+ 훿
2
)∕
2, 휎2
Δ
2
∕N
)
 , with 휎2
Δ2
= 1∕4
(
휎2
훿1
+ 휎2
훿2
+ 2휎훿1훿2
)
 . With the use of the pooled model, a 
merger retrospective could conclude that a merger was harmful and that intervention 
was insufficient, if Δ2 > 0 . With the use of the unpooled model one can identify the 
dynamics of post-merger prices, and would only conclude that the merger was harm-
ful if prices are still above the pre-merger level by the second period: if 𝛿2 > 0 . Both 
cases can be tested empirically. Given the asymptotic normality of the parameters, 
which follows the central limit theorem, the probability values are: 
Assume a simple case, where in both periods we have a small, 1 percent price 
increase ( ̂훿1 = 0.01 , 훿̂2 = 0.01 ), and standard deviations 휎̂훿1 = 휎̂훿2 = 0.1 . Assume 
also that our sample size is N = 200 . Under the assumption of independence 
between 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 , 휎훿1훿2 = 0 , we would conclude that the merger increases prices 
under the pooled, but not the unpooled model:
(2a)
훿2 =
[
E
(
pmt ∣ Wm = 1, d2 = 1
)
− E
(
pmt ∣ Wm = 0, d2 = 1
)]
−
−
[
E
(
pmt ∣ Wm = 1, d2 = 0
)
− E
(
pmt ∣ Wm = 0, d2 = 0
)]
.
(2b)
Δ2 =
(
E
[
pmt ∣ Wm = 1,
(
d1 + d2
)
= 1
]
− E
[
pmt ∣ Wm = 0,
(
d1 + d2
)
= 1
])
−
−
(
E
[
pmt ∣ Wm = 1,
(
d1 + d2
)
= 0
]
− E
[
pmt ∣ Wm = 0,
(
d1 + d2
)
= 0
])
.
(3)Pr
⎛⎜⎜⎝Zunpooled >
�𝛿2
�𝜎𝛿2∕
√
N
⎞⎟⎟⎠, Pr
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝Zpooled >
�
�𝛿1 + �𝛿2
�
∕2
�𝜎Δ2∕
√
N
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠.
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The purpose of this simple, back of the envelope example, is to highlight the impor-
tance of carefully choosing which model to use. To demonstrate further how much 
it matters, we examined all of the studies in our sample, where the unpooled model 
was used to ex-post identify the effect of mergers.14 Using the above method we 
then re-estimated these merger effects but now using the pooled model. The purpose 
of this exercise is to demonstrate the prevalence of making an erroneous conclusion 
on the evaluated merger, where the researcher (wrongly) chooses the pooled model.
For each merger that was analysed in each paper we report in Table 3 the effect 
that was estimated in the original paper for the first and the second year following 
the merger (relative to the pre-merger price), together with their standard errors (col-
umns 훿1 and 훿2 ). As was mentioned earlier, where more than one models was esti-
mated for each merger (different treatment and control groups, or different specifica-
tions) we report an average (unweighted) effect and standard error.15 The table also 
shows what the price effect and its standard error would have been had the authors 
of the respective studies (wrongly) used a pooled model (column Δ2 ). Not having 
access to the original data, to calibrate the ‘pooled’ standard errors, we rely on the 
assumption that the annual estimates are independent (their covariance is zero).16 
The table shows (dark grey) that in four out of the ten studies, the final conclu-
sion of the study would have been different under the pooled model. For example, 
Winston et al (2011) estimated that post-merger prices would have reverted to pre-
merger levels by the second year after the merger. Had the authors used the pooled 
model (column Δ2 ), they would have wrongly concluded that the merger led to a 
price-increase. In Kemp et al. (2012) and in Hosken et al. (2011) the authors esti-
mated that after an initial price drop after the merger, prices increased back to pre-
merger levels in the second post-merger year. Had they used a pooled model, they 
would have wrongly concluded that both mergers would have reduced post-merger 
prices. We also highlight (in lighter grey) the studies, where using the pooled model 
would have produced estimates with higher statistical power (become more signifi-
cant). For example Schumann et  al (2011) estimated a drop in post-merger prices 
both in the first and the second year after the merger. This was significant at 95%. 
Had the authors used a pooled model, their results would have shown significance at 
99%.
(4)
2 × Pr
⎛⎜⎜⎝Zunpooled > 0.010.1√200
⎞⎟⎟⎠ = 0.159 > 0.05, 2 × Pr
⎛⎜⎜⎝Zpooled > 0.010.07√200
⎞⎟⎟⎠
= 0.043 < 0.05.
14 As we explain below, from the pooled studies we cannot infer annual price-variation so we cannot 
calibrate what the results would have been under the unpooled model-specification.
15 As the purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate our analytical point, this should not affect our key 
findings. We could equally report a full list of all estimates reported in each study to demonstrate the 
same point.
16 We have also re-estimated these studies under the assumption of unit correlation and got qualitatively 
similar results.
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The main message of this simple exercise was to highlight that using the wrong 
model (pooled instead of unpooled) would have led to the wrong conclusion about 
the merger in 40% of the cases. Of course the best way to show the implications 
of using a pooled model would be to examine all of the studies that use the pooled 
model and re-estimate them using the unpooled model. The problem is, that we do 
not have any knowledge on the per-period price variation in these papers (and have 
no access to the data used). For this reason we turn to a set of Monte Carlo simula-
tions to demonstrate the gravity of the problem.
4  Simulations
In the following we simulate a set of cases, where we know how prices evolve post-
merger. The objective of this exercise is to gauge how likely it is that using the 
pooled model leads to the wrong conclusion on the effect of the merger. We con-
sider the following hypothetical cases. (1) Where following an initial post-merger 
price increase, prices revert to pre-merger levels; (2) Where post-merger prices do 
not increase immediately after the merger but they do within a reasonable amount 
of time; (3) Where the merger is followed by an immediate price drop, which then 
disappears; and (4) Where the post-merger price change is constant over multiple 
periods.
4.1  Simulation Framework Explained
First we simulate the price data. We associate a unitary average value to prices, as 
if prices were normalised to the average price. In this way we can think of propor-
tional changes, and avoid the use of logs. Then we draw a vector of iid values for the 
error term from a normal distribution with mean 0 and a value of standard devia-
tion that results in proportional changes in price. For example a standard deviation 
of 0.2 would mean that around 68% of the simulated price data would be less than 
20% away from its mean (allowing at most a 40% price change within the analysed 
period), and there would be 27% chance that prices diverge by 20–40% from the 
mean (allowing at most a 80% price change within the analysed period). As we are 
analysing a relatively short time period (two years) we think this is a reasonable 
working assumption, it is less likely—although still possible under the assumption 
of sd=0.2—that prices would increase or drop by a larger extent within such a short 
time period. For this reason we use 0.2 as our starting point but we provide the sim-
ulation results for other values in Fig. 3 in the “Appendix”. The price data are gener-
ated with the use of the unpooled model specification that is displayed in Eq. (1a). 
As our interest is on the DiD coefficients 훿1 and 훿2 , we set all other coefficients to 
zero.
We maintain the simplifying assumption that there are TR = 2 post-merger peri-
ods (and one pre-merger period), and that each period equals a calendar year. This 
works for expositional purposes but also in more than 2/3 of the merger retrospec-
tive studies in our sample, only two post-merger periods were looked at. Of course, 
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the simulations can easily be generalised to any TR > 2 . We also assume that there 
are T time series observations in each period. For example, if we have daily price 
data, then T = 365 . Finally we assume that there are M markets that are analysed. 
This is the cross-sectional dimension of our data.
Next, we use the simulated price vector to estimate the parameters of the model 
by OLS for both the unpooled—Eq. (1a)—and the pooled models, Eq.  (1b). We 
record the estimated unpooled coefficient 훿̂2 and pooled coefficient Δ̂2 and test if 
they are different from zero using a t test (at a significance level of 5%).17 We record 
the results of the t tests. We then repeat this 1000 times. Finally we compare the 
proportion of cases where a statistically significant price change is estimated for the 
pooled and the unpooled models. An important caveat has to be made here. In the 
simulations below we assume that any non-zero (positive) post-merger price change 
is harmful. Of course in reality most competition authorities operate with a ’safe 
harbour’ (for example 5%), below which the price increase is assumed to be small 
enough to be ignored. One could easily re-run the simulations assuming a harm 
benchmark that is different from what we currently use).
4.1.1  Wrongly Concluding that a Merger Should have been Intervened
We first view the case of a merger that should be considered unharmful because the 
second post-merger period price is the same as the pre-merger price. In generat-
ing the price data therefore we ensure that 훿2 = 0 and allow 훿1 to take on any value 
between zero and a 20% price increase: 훿1 = [0, 0.2] . Because Δ2 =
(
훿1 + 훿2
)
∕2 , 
it is clear that the pooled model estimates a price increase every time 𝛿1 > 0 , and 
could lead to the conclusion that there was insufficient intervention by the antitrust 
agency. Using the unpooled model we would correctly estimate that 훿2 = 0 : there 
was no need for (further) intervention.18 Moreover, the standard error of Δ̂2 will be 
different from the standard errors of 훿̂1 and 훿̂2 (simply because the dummy variable 
D2 pools the observations where d1 = 1 , or d2 = 1 ). Our simulations show how 
much this difference in the mean of 훿̂1 leads to the wrong conclusion about the 
merger.
Figure 1a displays the relative inaccuracy of the pooled model in comparison to 
the unpooled model: the probability of wrongly concluding in the pooled model that 
the merger intervention was insufficient—prices increased—minus the same prob-
ability in the unpooled model. The four lines represent four specific types of data: 
T refers to the number of time-series observations, and M refers to the number of 
cross-sections (markets). The data are time series dominated where T = 100 , and 
M = 10 , and cross-section dominated where M = 100 and T = 10.
17 As was implied earlier, we focus on the second period coefficient as for the purposes of merger analy-
sis, this has more importance. A merger with an immediate price increase that disappears by the second 
period should not warrant intervention. Similarly, a merger with no price increase in the first but a price 
increase in the second period should be considered harmful.
18 Although even in this case it would (approximately) incorrectly estimate a price-increase in 2.5% of 
the cases (as we are using a two-tail 95% significance test).
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We can see that as 훿1 increases, the probability of incorrectly concluding that 
the merger was harmful—that the intervention was insufficient—increases, and 
this is more pronounced when we have a larger sample. This is as expected: With 
small samples, the estimated coefficients have a higher standard error, and conse-
quently they are less likely to be significantly different from zero in both samples. 
As the sample size increases the Δ̂2 standard errors decrease and the hypothesis tests 
become more likely to be statistically significant: in this case predicting that the 
merger increased prices despite the fact that this price increase disappeared by the 
second period. The level of the probability of an erroneous conclusion is striking. 
When a large sample of data is available (such is the case in the analyses of petro-
leum mergers), even a 4% increase in the first year after the merger is enough for the 
pooled model to conclude wrongly (at 95% significance) that the merger increased 
prices despite the fact that prices reverted to pre-merger level in the second year. Put 
differently, in the previous studies where the pooled model was used and it estimated 
that the merger increased prices, there was a realistic chance that this price increase 
disappeared as early as the second year after the merger.
4.1.2  Wrongly Concluding That the Merger Did Not Need Intervention
Now consider the opposite scenario, where the merger increased prices, but only 
with a short delay (i.e., no price increase in the first year, and a price increase in the 
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Fig. 1  Probability of drawing wrong conclusions on the merger when using the pooled sample
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second year following the merger, 훿1 = 0 , and 𝛿2 > 0 ). Estimating Δ̂2 would always 
give a positive coefficient, therefore it would appear that even the pooled model 
would be able to detect that the merger would have needed intervention (because 
it increased prices). Figure 1b shows that this is not always the case. In fact, it is 
highly possible that the pooled model would estimate that Δ̂2 is not significantly 
different from zero and conclude, wrongly, that the merger did not increase prices. 
Relative to the unpooled model this could happen in up to 40% of the cases. For 
example, even if one has rich time-series and cross-sectional data, the pooled sam-
ple would be unable to identify mergers where prices increased by up to 3% in the 
second year after the merger. With smaller samples the problem would be even more 
pronounced. For example, with monthly data over 10 cross-sections (which is a very 
common data endowment) the pooled model would wrongly conclude that a merger 
did not increase prices even when the second year price increase was 10%; and in 
that case the larger is the second period price increase, the more pronounced is the 
wrong decision.
4.1.3  Wrongly Concluding That the Merger Reduced Prices
There are a large number of merger retrospectives that conclude that the merger 
resulted in a price reduction. To illustrate the weakness of using the pooled model in 
these cases, we present a scenario where the merger increased prices in the second 
post-merger year by 5%. In any interpretation these mergers should be considered 
harmful and the conclusion would be that (more) intervention would have been war-
ranted. However, when using the pooled model, the pooled dummy variable coef-
ficient ( ̂Δ2 ) will be negative if there was a sufficiently large price-drop in the first 
period. The expected value of Δ̂2 is zero where there was a price drop of 5% in the 
first period, therefore one would expect that the pooled model will lead to a wrong 
conclusion only if 𝛿1 < −5.
Figure 1c shows that—as expected—if the first period price drop is sufficiently 
large then the coefficient on the pooled dummy variable will always wrongly con-
clude that the merger reduced prices. With a large sample (daily prices over 100 
cross-sections) this will almost always be the case.
4.1.4  Mergers with Constant Post‑merger Price Effect
In this final scenario we examine how the pooled and unpooled samples perform 
where the price effect of the merger is constant ( 훿1 = 훿2 ). It would appear that there 
should not be any difference between the two estimates, because Δ2 = 훿1 = 훿2 , but 
again the difference in standard errors will have a role to play. Figure 1d shows the 
relative probability of finding a price increase is significant when post-merger prices 
are constant, using a pooled model. Put differently, this is the probability that the 
unpooled sample concludes that the merger did not increase prices even though the 
pooled model concludes that it did. The intuition is simple: The estimated pooled 
dummy variable coefficient Δ̂2 has a lower standard error where 훿1 = 훿2 , and is 
therefore more likely to estimate that the price increase is significantly different 
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from zero. This relative weakness of the unpooled model is small; but, when one 
deals with small samples, it could be around 10 percent.
The main message of this final point is important for research design. We would 
argue that the researcher should run the unpooled model and estimate yearly price 
effects, but if these are of similar magnitude (and non-significant) then it is good 
strategy to also run the pooled model (or at least conduct an F-test for the joint sig-
nificance of the yearly dummy variables). If the pooled model returns significant 
price effects or if the yearly dummy variables are jointly significant, then one could 
conclude that although the annual price effects are not individually significant, the 
overall post-merger effect is.
5  Conclusions
Merger retrospectives are typically conducted to inform policy-makers about the 
fitness of merger control for filtering and remedying price increasing mergers. For 
this reason the conclusion as to whether a merger increased prices is crucial. We 
showed above that the probability of making the wrong conclusion is high if the 
wrong empirical specification is used. If the antitrust agency predicted that the 
merger would lead to a temporary price hike, but prices would eventually (within a 
reasonable length of time) revert to pre-merger levels, then it would probably refrain 
from intervention. Therefore the retrospective study should not only examine how 
prices change on average, instead, the study should also estimate whether (and how 
quickly) prices revert to pre-merger levels.
We find that more than 85% (58 mergers) of previous studies estimate post-
merger average price effects (pooled sample), and per-period (annual) effects were 
estimated for only 10 mergers (unpooled sample). We argue that this is a mistaken 
approach as it masks information on post-merger price dynamics that would be cru-
cial for the assessment of the merger. By running a set of Monte Carlo simulations 
we show that estimating the mean post-merger price effect might lead to erroneous 
conclusions on the effect of the merger. Our simulations demonstrate that poten-
tially all studies (using the pooled sample) that concluded that the merger led to a 
price increase, could have been wrong, and that the price increase actually disap-
peared within a reasonable time. This is more likely where the studies had large 
samples (for example daily price data over large cross-sections). Similarly, up to 
half of the studies that concluded—based on the pooled sample—that the merger 
did not increase prices might have been wrong, and in actuality after a short period 
of unchanged prices, prices went up. Finally, studies that estimate that the merger 
reduced prices can potentially all be wrong in their conclusion on the merger if the 
merger was eventually followed by a price increase, but this was preceded by a suf-
ficiently large price drop.
In our view, where data are available to estimate the pooled sample, it should be 
equally available to estimate yearly effects—this is not about getting longer-spanning 
data but using a different model specification—and thus gather evidence on how 
prices evolve post-merger. Not only could this more accurately inform the researcher 
whether the antitrust authority’s intervention was appropriate, but accumulating a 
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large mass of these studies could tell us more about the dynamics of post-merger 
market self-correction.
An estimation that uses the unpooled sample does much more than just show 
whether the merger significantly increased prices in the K-th period. It gives the 
researcher highly valuable information on the dynamics of post-merger prices. This 
is important not only because one cares about whether prices eventually revert to 
pre-merger levels, but it also allows the identification of whether prices remain sta-
ble or unstable over time. These two outcomes can have very different welfare impli-
cations and would lead to different policy conclusions. The literature on the wel-
fare implication of price stability can offer us more general insights, starting with 
simplistic models of Waugh (1944), and followed by the highly influential work of 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) and Stiglitz (1981). From this tradition we can find a 
rich body of works that examine the effect of price stability with realistic assump-
tions about consumer utility functions and introducing risk-attitude (Turnovsky 
et al. 1980). These models show that—depending on consumers’ risk-averseness—
stable prices may mean lower or higher associated consumer surplus than do vola-
tile prices. However, the important point is that the welfare implications of stable 
and volatile post-merger prices are likely to be different, therefore it matters which 
empirical model is used for estimating the effect of mergers on these prices.
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Descriptive Statistics
Although not directly relevant for the main argument in this paper, we can reveal how 
the estimates in our meta-analysis vary across industries. Table 4 shows the industry 
average price effects (weighted by the inverse t-stat). Figure 2 shows the empirical 
distribution of these estimates for the industries with the largest number of estimates.
Table 4  Market-, and merger-level estimates and price variation by industry
Industry Market level estimates Merger level estimates
N es se N es se
Airlines 28 1.936 0.378 14 2.405 0.215
Books 11 0.022 0.156 2 1.028 0.584
Brewing 7 − 1.915 0.457 1 − 1.557 1.157
Car Parking 32 2.581 0.382 1 1.866 1.938
Cement 2 − 27 8.583 1 − 27 12.130
Computer games 2 − 19.087 3.713 1 − 19.083 5.251
Corrugating medium 2 0.950 4.727 1 0.950 6.672
Diazo microfilm 18 11.100 1.445 1 11.100 5.394
Energy 1 − 6 1.255 1 − 6 1.255
Health care 1 14.683 5.548 1 14.683 5.548
Home appliances 16 0.617 0.492 1 − 0.175 1.750
Hospitals 338 11.628 0.526 10 6.822 2.301
Law journal 11 13.267 1.155 4 11.069 1.502
Petroleum 54 − 2.039 0.097 17 − 0.361 0.218
Pharmaceuticals 9 33.271 0.299 1 18.489 0.979
Rail 30 0.951 1.584 3 1.111 4.662
Ready-to-eat cereal 11 9.346 0.564 1 5.164 1.455
Scientific journal 3 5.544 1.619 1 4.333 2.723
Spirits 28 0.155 0.158 1 − 0.679 0.889
Supermarkets 1 0.004 0.028 1 0.004 0.028
Telecoms 2 1.000 3.307 2 1.000 3.307
Titanium dioxide 1 28 12.219 1 28 12.219
Vesticular microfilm 18 22.839 2.329 1 22.839 8.869
Total 626 11.164 0.255 68 4.189 0.320
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Airlines, hospitals, and petroleum are the most researched areas, which is prob-
ably due to data availability. From these estimates only, it appears that petroleum 
mergers on average do not increase prices (the density curves in Fig. 2 also show 
that the estimates are very concentrated around zero). Rail mergers are typically not 
anti-competitive. On the other hand airline mergers seem to be price-increasing. 
Finally, the bimodal density of hospital estimates suggests two groups of hospital 
mergers, one clearly price-reducing, and another clearly price-increasing.
Additional Figures
The Effect of Serial Correlation and Clustering
In the main text we have assumed that there is no serial correlation in our simulated 
price data. We now relax on that assumption. Bertrand et  al. (2004) show that as 
a result of serial correlation OLS standard errors badly underestimate the standard 
deviation of the estimators. This means, that in the case of positive serial correla-
tion difference-in-differences studies (using OLS) would falsely estimate significant 
intervention effects. For this reason we look at how having serially correlated price 
data affects the above findings.
We define the error term as an AR(1) model with serial-correlation parameter 휌 
set to 0.8. We first estimate the pooled and the unpooled samples by OLS and then 
we cluster the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients and re-estimate both 
models.19 We confine the simulations to two cases, first, where the cross-sections are 
Fig. 2  Empirical distribution of price effect estimates for market and merger level data (% price change)
19 The cluster-robust formula for the estimated variance-covariance of the OLS estimator is: 
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Fig. 3  Probability of drawing wrong conclusions on the merger when using the pooled sample—assum-
ing different levels of standard deviation
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large and time period is small, and vice versa. In each case we plot the difference in 
the probability of estimating a significant price increase in the pooled sample, rela-
tive to the unpooled sample. Figure 4 plots how much more likely it is for the pooled 
sample to estimate a significant price increase than the unpooled sample.
The figure shows that our initial findings (Fig.  1a) still hold even with serially 
correlated data. In fact we find that serial correlation (or the clustering of stand-
ard errors) does not noticeably affect the difference between the pooled and the 
unpooled samples. We repeated these experiments for the other scenarios and found 
the same result.
Verifying Equivalence Between Average Unpooled and Pooled DiD 
Estimators
Assume a balanced panel with cross-section of length M and time series of length 
T = TR + 1 , so that there is a period before the merger (period TL = 1 ) and TR peri-
ods after the merger with no time fragments. Postulate that half of the cross-section 
is used as control and the other half as treatment, so that there are M / 2 units in each 
group. Without loss of generality and to ease the readiness of the proof, we model a 
simplified version of equations (1a) and (1b): 
(5a)pmt = 훽0 +
TR∑
k=1
훿kdkWm + 휀mt
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Fig. 4  Type I error: price change in period 1 and no price change in period 2 (clustered standard errors)
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 We analyse first Eq. (5a). Let X
MT×T
 indicate the matrix of all covariates, which in 
this case corresponds to the constant and TR ≡ T − 1 time dummy variables inter-
acted with the treatment dummy variable. The OLS estimator of the above regres-
sion is:
Let’s partition (X�X)−1 and X′p to be, respectively:
and
Then, based on (5a) we associate the elements to A = MT  , B = [M
2
,
M
2
,… ,
M
2
] , 
C = B� , and
Defining with e a TR × 1 column vector of ones, and recalling that the inverse of the 
partitioned matrix (7) is,
we have that BD−1 = e� , D−1C = e , BD−1C = M
2
(T − 1) , and A − BD−1C =
M
2
(T + 1) . Therefore, the cells of the partitioned matrix in (10) are:
(5b)pmt = 훽0 + ΔTRDTRWm + 휀mt.
(6)?̂? =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝛽0
𝛿1
⋮
𝛿TR
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ = (X
�X)−1X�p.
(7)(X�X)−1 =
[
A B
C D
]−1
(8)X�p =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
P
P1
…
PTR
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≡
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑
m
∑
t pmt∑
m pm1Wm
…∑
m pmTRWm
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
(9)D ≡
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
M
2
0 0 0
0
M
2
0 0
…
0 0 0
M
2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
(10)
[
A B
C D
]−1
=
[
(A − BD−1C)−1 −(A − BD−1C)−1BD−1
−D−1C(A − BD−1C)−1 D−1 + D−1C(A − BD−1C)−1BD−1
]
,
(11)
[
A B
C D
]−1
=
2
M(T + 1)
[
1 −e�
−e (T + 1)I + ee�
]
,
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implying that
Now, consider the specification in Eq. (5b). From above, we have that X′p modifies 
to:
and now B = C = D = M
2
(T − 1) and A of course remains the same, A = MT  , lead-
ing to
Yielding,
which verifies that 1
T−1
∑TR
k=1
𝛿k = Δ̂2.
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